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THE FEDERAL ROLE IN UNIVERSAL PRE-K 
 
Brian McWalters* 
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
In his 2013 State of the Union address, President Barack 
Obama proposed that the federal government work with states 
to make “high quality preschool available to every single child 
in America.”1 In the following days and years, the Obama ad-
ministration, seeking to garner support for its Preschool for All 
proposal, echoed the arguments that have long been made in 
favor of preschool.2 Neuroscience research shows that the hu-
man brain at three and four years-old, the age at which children 
attend preschool, is in a “sensitive period” and is optimally re-
ceptive to intellectual stimulation.3 Social science likewise sug-
gests there is a unique window of opportunity at preschool age 
to positively impact a child’s life.4 Numerous studies show that 
 
* Policy Associate, Accountability Counsel; J.D., Georgetown University Law Center. The au-
thor would like to thank Professor Eloise Pasachoff for all her guidance, on this article et al. 
And his parents, for everything. 
 1.  President Barack Obama, State of the Union Address (Feb. 12, 2013). 
 2.  See OFF. OF THE PRESS SECRETARY, THE WHITE HOUSE, FACT SHEET: HELPING 
ALL WORKING FAMILIES WITH YOUNG CHILDREN AFFORD CHILD CARE (Jan. 21, 2015), 
2015 WL 269545, at *1 (pointing to the body of evidence showing the positive impact pre-
school has on numerous life outcomes); OFF. OF THE PRESS SECRETARY, THE WHITE HOUSE, 
PRESS BRIEFING BY PRESS SECRETARY JOSH EARNEST AND SECRETARY OF EDUCATION 
KING (Sept. 29, 2016), 2016 WL 5540012, at *3 (noting the high returns of preschool as a soci-
etal investment); OFF. OF THE PRESS SECRETARY, THE WHITE HOUSE, FACT SHEET 
PRESIDENT OBAMA’S PLAN FOR EARLY EDUCATION FOR ALL AMERICANS (Feb. 13, 2013), 
2013 WL 543888, at *1 (advocating for preschool as a tool for reducing inequality and leveling 
the playing field for children from low-income families). 
 3.  Pat Levitt, Building Brain Architecture and Chemistry: A Primer for Policymakers, 
in INVESTING IN EARLY CHILDHOOD DEVELOPMENT 3, 16 (Alvin R. Tarlov & Michelle Pre-
court Debbink eds., 2008). 
 4.  See James E. Ryan, A Constitutional Right to Preschool?, 94 CAL. L. REV. 49, 50 
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attending preschool can have a positive impact on a wide range 
of life outcomes, including increased performance in later 
schooling, fewer interactions with the criminal justice system, 
and higher earnings as adults.5 
While not impossible to effect these positive outcomes 
with educational interventions later in life, preschool presents 
an optimal opportunity to make a substantial impact at relative-
ly minimal cost.6 Indeed, the evident economic benefits of pre-
school is one of its major selling points.7 Most cost-benefit 
analyses suggest that investment in preschool produces eco-
nomic gains, resulting from lower special education placement 
rates, reduced grade repetition, decreased welfare dependency, 
and fewer costs for the criminal justice system, that significantly 
outweigh the costs.8 
Education experts rightly caution that preschool is not a 
panacea for all societal ills and that it should not be hailed as 
such at the expense of other education reforms.9 However, pre-
school is worth prioritizing. Whereas the efficacy of many edu-
cation policies is a matter of contentious socio-scientific debate, 
a significant majority of the large body of empirical evidence 
assessing preschool points towards its efficacy as a tool for 
meaningful impact.10 
Preschool reform is also thought to be less inert than 
other education policy areas and, therefore, more responsive to 
 
(2006). 
 5.  Id. at 57. 
 6.  DAVID L. KIRP, THE SANDBOX INVESTMENT 110 (2007); Levitt, supra note 3, at 
16. 
 7.  Ryan, supra note 4, at 92. 
 8.  Id. at 66-67 (canvassing research that shows return-on-investment ratios ranging 
from two-to-one to over seven-to-one); KIRP, supra note 6, at 82, 160-61 (citing a study esti-
mating a 3 to 1 return on a state’s investment in UPK). 
 9.  Ryan, supra note 4, at 63; KIRP, supra note 6, at 8; ELIZABETH ROSE, THE 
PROMISE OF PRESCHOOL: FROM HEAD START TO UNIVERSAL PRE-KINDERGARTEN 226 
(2010). 
 10.  Ryan, supra note 4, at 50, 68-69, 88; KIRP, supra note 6, at 78. 
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advocacy efforts.11 Compared to K-12 education, preschool is a 
relatively new issue with fewer entrenched special interest 
groups to resist reform.12 The preschool iron may be particular-
ly hot right now; there is broad public support from a wide 
range of entities, including teachers unions, business leaders, 
economists, and philanthropists, for increasing access to pre-
school.13 It is unclear whether any type of early childhood edu-
cation (ECE) reform is likely to be acted upon by the current 
administration; the first budget summary released by President 
Donald Trump proposed a significant reduction to the De-
partment of Education’s budget.14 The administration’s support 
for school-choice initiatives,15 and the First Daughter’s focus on 
child care,16 suggest that a program like the Child Care and 
Development Block Grant, which “promote[s] parental choice 
to empower working parents to make their own decisions re-
garding the child care services,”17 may be the only new early 
childhood expenditure palatable to the new administration. 
However, the overall trend for preschool reform has been ris-
ing bipartisan support.18 The conventional conservative argu-
 
 11.  Ryan, supra note 4, at 51; BRENDA K. BUSHOUSE, UNIVERSAL PRESCHOOL: 
POLICY CHANGE, STABILITY, AND THE PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS 109 (2009); ROSE, supra 
note 9, at 137-38. 
 12.  BUSHOUSE, supra note 11, at 109. 
 13.  Ryan, supra note 4, at 49-50. 
 14.  Emma Brown & Danielle Douglas-Gabriel, Trump Seeks to Slash Education De-
partment but Make Big Push for School Choice, WASH. POST, Mar. 16, 2017, 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/education/trump-seeks-to-slash-education-department-
but-make-big-push-for-school-choice/2017/03/15/63b8b6f8-09a1-11e7-b77c-
0047d15a24e0_story.html. 
 15.  Id. 
 16.  Sahil Kapur et al., Inside Ivanka Trump’s Campaign for a $500 Billion Child-Care 
Plan, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 23, 2017), https://www.bloomberg.com/politics/articles/2017-02-
23/ivanka-trump-is-pushing-her-500-billion-child-care-plan-on-hill. Child care and preschool 
are sometimes treated as analytical distinct, with the former focused on empowering mothers to 
pursue economic opportunities and the latter focused on the education of children. The First 
Daughter’s conception of child care seems to embody this divide. Id. 
 17.  42 U.S.C. § 9857(b)(2) (2012). 
 18.  DAVID L. KIRP, THE SANDBOX INVESTMENT 160 (2007) (quoting Republican poll-
ster Frank Luntz as saying “Republicans favor these programs at a much higher rate than we 
expected.”). 
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ment that the government should have no role in ECE has lost 
ground to the growing public sentiment that preschool is a wise 
societal investment, and many politicians on the right have 
modified their stance accordingly.19 The enactment of new pre-
school programs as recently as 2015 by a Republican-controlled 
Congress20 suggests that such initiatives could again be politi-
cally viable in the near future. 
Public support is high, not only for preschool generally, 
but specifically for the federal government taking a prominent 
role in expanding access to preschool.21 An issue with national 
implications, including the health of the nation’s democratic in-
stitutions and economy, a prominent federal role in ECE is 
warranted.22 Furthermore, the federal government, while not 
without its own fiscal constraints, can nonetheless use its con-
siderable resources to assist states that have the will but lack the 
capacity to expand preschool on their own.23 Lastly, there is 
more historical justification for a strong federal role in ECE. 
Though education has long been considered a central responsi-
bility of state and local governments, a common argument 
made against federal intervention,24 ECE is actually one area 
where the federal government has traditionally had a leading 
role.25 The federal government created and administered the 
 
 19.  James E. Ryan, A Constitutional Right to Preschool?, 94 CAL. L. REV. 49, 93 (2006) 
(noting that such conservative arguments are particularly unavailing when preschool is volun-
tary, see infra n.28); BUSHOUSE, supra note 11, at 160; KIRP, supra note 18, at 166-67. 
 20.  Every Student Succeeds Act, Pub. L. No. 114-95, § 9212(d)(5), 129 Stat. 1802, 2154 
(2015). 
 21.  2015: Another Momentous Year for Early Childhood Education, FIRST FIVE YEARS 
FUND (Dec. 30, 2015), http://ffyf.org/2015-another-momentous-year-for-early-childhood-
education/ (“An overwhelming majority of the voting public ranked early childhood develop-
ment as one of the most important federal issues.”). 
 22.  Shannon K. McGovern, Note, A New Model for States as Laboratories for Reform: 
How Federalism Informs Education Policy, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1519, 1543-46 (2011) (discuss-
ing the need for a federal role in education generally); See infra notes 32-39 and accompanying 
text, noting how these arguments extend logically to preschool. 
 23.  McGovern, supra note 22, at 1546-47. 
 24.  Id. at 1525, 1529. 
 25.  Ryan, supra note 19, at 54. 
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national Head Start program, which funds a range of early 
childhood developmental programs that serve children from 
low-income families,26 decades before most states took up the 
preschool mantle.27 
While the efficacy of preschool may enjoy a general 
consensus, there is disagreement among advocates about 
whether efforts should be focused on creating targeted pre-
school programs (TPK), in which education services are made 
available specifically for low-income children, or establishing 
universal preschool (UPK),28 in which all children, regardless of 
socio-economic status, are afforded the opportunity to attend 
free preschool.29 Indeed, Obama’s proposed initiative embodied 
this divide. Notwithstanding its titular objective, Preschool for 
All would have only required states to extend publicly-funded 
preschool to four-year-olds from families at or below 200% of 
the poverty line.30 However, with additional features incentiviz-
ing states to extend access even further,31 UPK may have been 
the ultimate goal. 
This paper argues that the federal government should 
promote UPK reform and that it can best accomplish this 
through a competitive grant program that cognizes the state-
level conditions most conducive to UPK implementation. Part 
 
 26.  42 U.S.C. § 9831 et seq. (2012). 
 27.  Ryan, supra note 19, at 54. 
 28.  UPK usually connotes a voluntary program in which parents are given the option, 
rather than required, to enroll their children. Aryn M. Dotterer et al., Comparing Universal 
and Targeted Prekindergarten Programs, in THE PROMISE OF PRE-K 65, 66 (Robert C. Pianta 
& Carollee Howes eds., 2009). This paper uses UPK in this prevailing sense and will not dis-
cuss this policy design choice, except to say, briefly, that pursuing a mandatory system of UPK 
would, at this time, be politically infeasible. Ryan, supra note 19, at 92-93. 
 29.  Grover J. Whitehurst, Can We Be Hard-Headed About Preschool? A Look at Uni-
versal and Targeted Pre-K, BROOKINGS INSTITUTION (Jan. 23, 2013), 
https://www.brookings.edu/research/can-we-be-hard-headed-about-preschool-a-look-at-
universal-and-targeted-pre-k/. 
 30.  OFF. OF THE PRESS SECRETARY, THE WHITE HOUSE, FACT SHEET: HELPING 
ALL WORKING FAMILIES WITH YOUNG CHILDREN AFFORD CHILD CARE (Jan. 21, 2015), 
2015 WL 269545, at *3. 
 31.  Id. 
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II will posit that UPK is a worthwhile goal, both because of the 
impact it stands to make for all children and because UPK sys-
tems may ultimately produce better results for low-income 
children than TPK. Part III will show that a competitive grant 
program, rather than a cost-sharing initiative or formula grant 
program, is the most practical paradigm for effectuating mean-
ingful UPK reform, and that such a program should award 
funds to states, rather than more local government entities. Part 
IV will examine the state-level process of UPK implementation 
in three pioneering states. Part V will then turn back to pro-
gram design, this time abstracting from the state-level examina-
tion the crucial factors to successful UPK implementation and 
recommending how a competitive grant program can best lev-
erage these factors. 
 
II. UNIVERSAL VS. TARGETED PRESCHOOL 
 
a. Differing Aims of Universal and Targeted Preschool 
 
Proponents of UPK and TPK often focus on distinct 
normative considerations. UPK advocates note that many of 
the reasons for why Americans value universal access to a free 
K-12 education apply with equal force to preschool.32 Educa-
tion is often exalted for its role in molding conscientious citi-
zens and participants in our democratic system.33 Education re-
formers have, since this country’s infancy, emphasized its role 
in cultivating an informed and capable citizenry, and this func-
tion is responsible, in part, for the adoption of a universally-free 
 
 32.  ELIZABETH ROSE, THE PROMISE OF PRESCHOOL: FROM HEAD START TO 
UNIVERSAL PRE-KINDERGARTEN 146 (2010). 
 33.  Susan H. Bitensky, Theoretical Foundations for A Right to Education Under the 
U.S. Constitution: A Beginning to the End of the National Education Crisis, 86 NW. U. L. 
REV. 550, 550–51 (1992); Richard L. Wobbekind, On the Importance of Education, 47 BUS. 
ECON. 90, 91 (2012). 
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K-12 education system in every state.34 Given the body of evi-
dence suggesting that early childhood education makes partici-
pants more amenable to later schooling,35 this rationale for uni-
versal education extends logically to preschool.36 
Universal education also has important implications for 
the national economy, dictating the strength of the national 
workforce and portending the economy’s ability to grow.37 
Some economists have concluded that preschool is, in the long 
run, significantly more effective at boosting economic produc-
tivity than K-12 reform initiatives or even job training pro-
grams.38 This helps explain why the UPK movement has found 
some of its most ardent supporters in the business community.39 
Advocates of TPK focus on preschool as a tool for nar-
rowing the achievement gap that exists between children from 
low-income backgrounds and those from wealthier households. 
Low-income children often enter kindergarten significantly 
behind their peers in academic capabilities, and this initial gap 
often expands as their schooling progresses.40 Because a gov-
ernment has limited resources with which to make preschool 
freely accessible, TPK advocates argue that those resources 
should be focused on those children who would not otherwise 
have access.41 
 
 34.  Bitensky, supra note 33, at 551. 
 35.  James E. Ryan, A Constitutional Right to Preschool?, 94 CAL. L. REV. 49, 57 
(2006). 
 36.  See id. at 51; ROSE, supra note 32, at 146. 
 37.  Shannon K. McGovern, Note, A New Model for States as Laboratories for Reform: 
How Federalism Informs Education Policy, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1519, 1543-44 (2011). 
 38.  DAVID L. KIRP, THE SANDBOX INVESTMENT 78 (2007). 
 39.  KIRP, supra note 38, at 76; ROSE, supra note 32, at 135; see infra note 164 and ac-
companying text. 
 40.  Ryan, supra note 35, at 56. 
 41.  Id. at 68; ROSE, supra note 32, at 131; Grover J. Whitehurst, Can We Be Hard-
Headed About Preschool? A Look at Universal and Targeted Pre-K, BROOKINGS 
INSTITUTION (Jan. 23, 2013), https://www.brookings.edu/research/can-we-be-hard-headed-
about-preschool-a-look-at-universal-and-targeted-pre-k/. 
MCWALTERS_MACROS.DOCM (DO NOT DELETE) 4/10/2019  12:12 PM 
BYU Education & Law Journal [2019 
28 
 
Though low-income children would have access to pre-
school under a UPK system, TPK advocates worry that UPK 
spreads finite public resources too thin, diluting the quality of 
education received by low-income children for the benefit of 
families that ostensibly have other means to provide for their 
young children’s education.42 Furthermore, UPK systems 
could, TPK advocates fear, fall into the same funding paradox 
that has bedeviled K-12 funding, in which schools serving chil-
dren from wealthier localities frequently receive more resources 
than the schools serving low-income children that are more in 
need of resources.43 
 
b. Overlapping Impact: Equality 
 
The intuitive appeal of preschool as a means to level the 
playing field for disadvantaged children bolsters the TPK para-
digm’s claim to primacy in the preschool debate. However, 
there are reasons to believe that UPK systems can also advance 
these interests for low-income children. First, there is reason to 
believe that legislators seeking to design equitable UPK systems 
will not face the same obstacles that have impeded the progress 
of K-12 finance reform. The entrenched and unwieldy bureau-
cracies that have accumulated over the long history of K-12 ed-
ucation are rare in the realm of ECE,44 and policymakers have 
proven adept at integrating those ECE entities that are pre-
existing into mixed-delivery systems. Recently, states have in-
deed been successful in designing systems that provide universal 
access while prioritizing the interests of low-income children.45  
 
 42.  Natalie Gomez-Velez, Can Universal Pre-K Overcome Extreme Race and Income 
Segregation to Reach New York’s Neediest Children? The Importance of Legal Infrastructure 
and the Limits of the Law, 63 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 319, 340, 351 (2015). 
 43.  Id. at 340. 
 44.  See supra notes 11-12 and accompanying text. 
 45.  Gomez-Velez, supra note 42, at 336 (noting that, although budgetary problems have 
impeded its implementation, New York State’s UPK law is well-designed to “serve the interests 
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More importantly, political realities bring into question 
whether TPK programs are actually more effective than UPK 
in ensuring the quality of the preschool for low-income chil-
dren. TPK programs are often marginalized in public discourse 
as welfare programs and subjected to proposed budget cuts, es-
pecially in fiscally conservative states.46 TPK programs that 
struggle to maintain funding must choose between making cuts 
that hurt quality47 or further limiting eligibility to only the most 
impoverished children.48 Many TPK programs are, as a result 
of dwindling funding, unable to serve all of the low-income 
children in their ambit,49 a shortcoming made all the more glar-
ing by the fact that many families not considered low-income 
nonetheless struggle with ECE costs.50 
UPK tends to garner wide public support, making it less 
likely to end up on a legislature’s proverbial chopping block.51 
In Georgia and Oklahoma, two model UPK states discussed be-
low, commentators suggest that the universality of their pre-
school programs has lifted them above the partisan fray and en-
sured their longevity.52 For two decades now, these states have 
 
in reaching vulnerable children, ensuring high quality programs, and addressing issues neces-
sary to close achievement gaps.”). 
 46.  BRENDA K. BUSHOUSE, UNIVERSAL PRESCHOOL: POLICY CHANGE, STABILITY, 
AND THE PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS 60-61 (2009); KIRP, supra note 6, at 89. 
 47.  DAVID L. KIRP, THE SANDBOX INVESTMENT 39, 45, 67 (2007) (noting that while 
quality, not money, is the end sought, funding a vital means to that end). 
 48.  See Sara Dorn, Ohio Preschool Funding Policy Cuts Millions from Schools Serving 
Poorest Kids, CLEVELAND.COM (Aug. 9, 2016), http://www.cleveland.com/metro 
/index.ssf/2016/08/ohio_preschool_funding_ policy.html. 
 49.  ELIZABETH ROSE, THE PROMISE OF PRESCHOOL: FROM HEAD START TO 
UNIVERSAL PRE-KINDERGARTEN 132 (2010). 
 50.  Wilson Greene, Universal Preschool: A Costly but Worthy Goal, 35 J.L. & EDUC. 
555, 555 (2006); ROSE, supra note 49, at 109, 113, 136; see Ethan Wolff-Mann, Is Your State 
One of 23 Where Pre-K Costs More Than College?, TIME, April 11, 2016, 
http://time.com/money/4289032/pre-k-costs-more-than-college-in-23-states/. 
 51.  Gomez-Velez, supra note 42, at 351; Fawn Johnson, How Georgia Got Republicans 
and Democrats to Embrace Universal Pre-K, THE ATLANTIC, May 7, 2014, 
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2014/05/how-georgia-got-republicans-and-
democrats-to-embrace-universal-pre-k/430899/. 
 52.  See infra notes 117-118, 149-150 and accompanying text. 
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been able to offer access to high quality preschool to all families 
struggling with ECE costs, as well as to children from wealthier 
families.53 
In addition to its ability to secure stable funding, UPK 
systems also tend to have other unique characteristics that are 
conducive to producing high quality programs for low-income 
children. UPK systems are more likely than TPK to produce 
preschool classrooms that are socio-economically diverse,54 a 
condition that studies suggest can significantly enhance out-
comes for low-income children.55 It is possible for TPK pro-
grams to utilize design mechanisms, such as subsidized spots for 
low-income children in private preschools, to produce diversity, 
and UPK systems will not always produce diversity in localities 
fraught with socio-economic isolation.56 However, empirical 
evidence from the current ECE landscape suggests that socio-
economic diversity is more easily accomplished through UPK.57 
UPK programs can also be more easily incorporated in-
to existing public elementary school infrastructures, providing 
access to valuable commodities such as facilities and profession-
al development resources.58 Assimilation with public elementary 
schools also fosters the proper alignment of curricula and learn-
ing goals, helping to ensure that the academic gains produced 
by preschool are built upon.59 Though TPK programs can also 
 
 53.  See infra notes 124-125, 156-157 and accompanying text. 
 54.  Aryn M. Dotterer et al., Comparing Universal and Targeted Prekindergarten Pro-
grams, in THE PROMISE OF PRE-K 65, 67 (Robert C. Pianta & Carollee Howes eds., 2009). 
 55.  DAVID L. KIRP, THE SANDBOX INVESTMENT 89-90 (2007); ROSE, supra note 49, 
at 148; CLIO CHANG, THE CENTURY FOUNDATION, WHY INTEGRATED PRESCHOOLS HELP 
EVERY STUDENT (2015). 
 56.  Aryn M. Dotterer et al., Comparing Universal and Targeted Prekindergarten Pro-
grams, in THE PROMISE OF PRE-K 69, 74 (Robert C. Pianta & Carollee Howes eds., 2009); 
KIRP, supra note 49, at 89-90. 
 57.  Aryn M. Dotterer et al., Comparing Universal and Targeted Prekindergarten Pro-
grams, in THE PROMISE OF PRE-K 70 (Robert C. Pianta & Carollee Howes eds., 2009); KIRP, 
supra note 49, at 89-90. 
 58.  ROSE, supra note 49, at 175, 177. 
 59.  Id. at 177; Kristie Kauerz, Learning from Others: State Efforts to Expand Services 
MCWALTERS_MACROS.DOCM (DO NOT DELETE) 4/10/2019  12:12 PM 
1] The Federal Role in Universal Pre-K 
31 
 
be designed to mesh with a public elementary school system, 
UPK presents a unique opportunity to do so uniformly and 
avoid the variability that results from a patchwork of separate 
ECE programs.60 
Implementing a UPK system can even have a reciprocal 
positive effect on public elementary schools.61 In some states, 
pursuit of UPK has put a renewed focus on ensuring quality 
kindergarten, a development that could further boost the quali-
ty of education received by public school children.62 Some ad-
vocates go so far as to theorize that creating UPK could be the 
first step in recalibrating early elementary school education to 
be more age-appropriate in light of our evolving understanding 
of adolescent development, though this dynamic has yet to ma-
terialize in practice.63 
Studies comparing the quality of current universal and 
targeted preschool programs suggest neither paradigm has a 
clear advantage in terms of producing a quality experience for 
low-income children.64 UPK programs tend to have longer 
class days and more experienced teachers while TPK programs 
tend to produce smaller child-teacher ratios and score better on 
observational assessments of quality.65 Measures of academic 
 
and Build Systems of Early Care and Education, in INVESTING IN EARLY CHILDHOOD 
DEVELOPMENT, supra note 3, at 85, 102. 
 60.  See ELIZABETH ROSE, THE PROMISE OF PRESCHOOL: FROM HEAD START TO 
UNIVERSAL PRE-KINDERGARTEN 96 (2010). 
 61.  Id. at 227-28. 
 62.  Natalie Gomez-Velez, Can Universal Pre-K Overcome Extreme Race and Income 
Segregation to Reach New York’s Neediest Children? The Importance of Legal Infrastructure 
and the Limits of the Law, 63 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 319, 334 (2015); Kauerz, supra note 59, at 
102-03. 
 63.  ROSE, supra note 60, at 227. 
 64.  Aryn M. Dotterer et al., Comparing Universal and Targeted Prekindergarten Pro-
grams, in THE PROMISE OF PRE-K 65, 71-74 (Robert C. Pianta & Carollee Howes eds., 2009). 
Other studies have found the public schools generally provided higher quality preschool than 
do private providers, ROSE, supra note 9, at 177, which suggests UPK should be prioritized 
over some TPK programs, like CCDB, that provide vouchers to low-income families to be 
spent on private ECE providers. 
 65.  Dotterer et al., supra note 64, at 71-72. 
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gains are likewise unable to definitively resolve the debate, with 
some metrics suggesting a narrow advantage for UPK and oth-
ers a narrow advantage for TPK.66 These conclusions should, 
however, ease fears that pursuing UPK implementation will 
significantly dilute the quality of preschool available to low-
income children. UPK’s ability to serve national interests67 and 
ensure access for moderate-income children68 should therefore 
dictate its primacy as a matter of federal policy. 
 
III.MACRO-DESIGN CHOICES: CHOOSING THE MODEL 
FOR FEDERAL INTERVENTION 
 
a. Choosing a Federal Intervention Paradigm 
 
Obama’s Preschool for All (PSA) proposal contemplated 
a federal-state partnership in which the federal government and 
each of the 50 states shared the costs of implementing and op-
erating state-wide preschool.69 The federal government would 
assume a significant share of the costs at first, with states gradu-
ally assuming more of the costs over time.70 The appeal of such 
a proposal is the sweeping impact it promises: almost instanta-
neous access to preschool for every preschool-aged child in the 
nation, regardless of the state in which he or she resides. How-
ever, had the Obama administration fleshed out the details of 
its fledgling initiative, it would have uncovered some formida-
ble legal and political obstacles to such a federal endeavor. 
 
 66.  Id. at 72-73. 
 67.  See supra notes 33-39 and accompanying text. 
 68.  See supra notes 51-63 and accompanying text. 
 69.  OFF. OF THE PRESS SECRETARY, THE WHITE HOUSE, FACT SHEET PRESIDENT 
OBAMA’S PLAN FOR EARLY EDUCATION FOR ALL AMERICANS (Feb. 13, 2013), 2013 WL 
543888, at *1. 
 70.  BUDGET OFFICE, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., FISCAL YEAR 2015 BUDGET SUMMARY 
AND BACKGROUND INFORMATION  13 (2015) [hereinafter BUDGET SUMMARY]. 
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The federal government’s legal ability, never mind its 
political ability, to mandate the implementation of UPK in eve-
ry state is dubious.71 It is unclear whether Congress’s Com-
merce Clause power, which the Supreme Court has narrowed 
in recent decades, would enable it to mandate such an educa-
tion policy.72 Even with a constitutional basis for such a policy, 
the federal government would, in order to avoid violating the 
anti-commandeering principle of the Tenth Amendment, 
seemingly have to implement and operate a UPK system with-
out requiring any assistance from state or local governments,73 a 
costly expansion of the federal bureaucracy that is presumably a 
political nonstarter. 
Any federal UPK policy would therefore likely have to 
be accomplished using Congress’s Spending Clause powers, the 
means through which almost all of the federal government’s 
education policy has been enacted.74 Implementing UPK in all 
50 states is seemingly possible through use of a formula grant 
program, in which every state is offered a sum of funding de-
termined algorithmically using criteria such as population.75 
This is the paradigm utilized by Elementary and Secondary 
Education Act (ESEA), which has provided substantial educa-
tional funds to every state for decades.76 
 
 71.  James E. Ryan, The Tenth Amendment and Other Paper Tigers: The Legal 
Boundaries of Education Governance, in WHO’S IN CHARGE HERE? THE TANGLED WEB OF 
SCHOOL GOVERNANCE AND POLICY 42, 47 (Noel Epstein ed., 2004). 
 72.  Id. (noting that in United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995), “the Court empha-
sized that education was an area in which states ‘historically have been sovereign’ and suggested 
that public schools might simply be beyond the scope of Congress’s regulatory authority.”). 
 73.  See id. (discussing New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992), and Printz v. 
United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997)). 
 74.  See Eloise Pasachoff, Conditional Spending After NFIB v. Sebelius: The Example 
of Federal Education Law, 62 AM. U. L. REV. 577, 581 (2013). 
 75.  Paul Manna & Laura L. Ryan, Competitive Grants and Education Federalism: Pres-
ident Obama’s Race to the Top Program in Theory and Practice, 41 PUBLIUS 522, 531-32 
(2011). 
 76.  20 U.S.C. § 6332 (2012). 
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However, formula grants under the Spending Clause 
power are also subject to legal constraints. A new UPK grant 
program cannot attempt to coerce involvement of every state 
by, for instance, conditioning future ESEA funds on participa-
tion in the UPK program.77 A new formula grant program also 
likely entails an expensive, long-term federal investment. In his 
proposed budget, Obama requested from Congress $75 billion 
over 10 years to fund PSA.78 Though support in general is high 
for a federal role in preschool reform,79 the political feasibility 
of a new ECE expenditure as large as Head Start, which is the 
frequent target of proposed budget cuts by prominent fiscal 
conservatives,80 is questionable. 
Formula grants are also of limited utility where the goal 
is to implement specific reforms.81 Though the federal govern-
ment can attach conditions to an offer of a formula grant, re-
quiring states that accept to comply with certain policy direc-
tives, these conditions tend to be general, leaving states ample 
leeway to use funds in ways that diverge from the federal gov-
ernment’s priorities.82 Though the federal government could 
theoretically attach more stringent conditions, flexibility for 
formula grantees seems especially important given the current 
 
 77.  See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2603–04 (2012). But see 
Pasachoff, supra note 74, at 617, which argues that ESEA reauthorizations are distinguishable 
from the legislation at issue in NFIB and thereby suggests a possibly permissible means to coax 
states into implementing a new policy initiative. 
 78.  BUDGET SUMMARY, supra note 70, at 13. 
 79.  See 2015: Another Momentous Year for Early Childhood Education, FIRST FIVE 
YEARS FUND (Dec. 30, 2015), http://ffyf.org/2015-another-momentous-year-for-early-
childhood-education/. 
 80.  See Robert Costa, House GOP Poverty Report Focuses on Reforming Welfare, 
Overhauling Social Programs, WASH. POST, Mar. 2, 2014, https://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
politics/house-gop-budget-will-focus-on-reforming-welfare-overhauling-social-
programs/2014/03/02/26b17b78-a23e-11e3-84d4-e59b1709222c_story.html. 
 81.  Benjamin Michael Superfine, Stimulating School Reform: The American Recovery 
and Reinvestment Act and the Shifting Federal Role in Education, 76 Mo. L. Rev. 81, 107 
(2011). 
 82.  ROBERT JAY DILGER & EUGENE BOYD, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, 
BLOCK GRANTS: PERSPECTIVES AND CONTROVERSIES 2, 9-10 (2014). 
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political climate. In recent years, there has been unprecedented 
instances of states turning down significant formula funds be-
cause of the conditions attached.83 With flexibility something of 
a political prerequisite, a UPK formula grant program might 
actually result in little UPK reform. If, for instance, political re-
alities necessitate minimal matching and maintenance of effort 
requirements, a grantee could use formula funds to merely sup-
plant pre-existing ECE funds and use these newly freed-up 
funds for any number of purposes with little relation to UPK.84 
An alternative to formula grants is competitive grant 
programs, in which grantees are chosen among a pool of appli-
cants on the basis of some federal-determined set of criteria. 
Competitive grant programs are typically limited in duration 
and, consequently, tend to focus on increasing the capacity of 
grantees so that they can continue progressing toward policy 
goals after the program ends.85 That competitive grant pro-
grams do not usually entail a perpetual and expensive federal 
role might explain why Congress has frequently utilized this 
paradigm for education programs in recent years.86  
By inviting participation, rather than attempting to coax 
it from every state, competitive grant programs are more faith-
 
 83.  The most infamous example of this is the Medicaid expansion saga, in which nearly 
20 states declined an influx of funding that would have amounted to billions of dollars. This 
episode may be of limited use as an analogy, given particularly contentious climate surrounding 
the Affordable Care Act and certain design features like the eventual 10% state match require-
ment. However, similar threats to refuse substantial federal funds were made about the educa-
tion funds included in the State Fiscal Stabilization Fund under the American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act, see Superfine, supra note 81, at 107, further suggesting a new willingness 
among states to reject new formula funding. 
 84.  See KENNETH FINEGOLD ET AL., THE URBAN INST., BLOCK GRANTS: DETAILS 
OF THE BUSH PROPOSALS 7 (2004). 
 85.  The Preschool Development Grant program, discussed infra notes 90-91 and ac-
companying text, requires states to describe plan to sustain grant-related activities after the 
program ends. Every Student Succeeds Act, Pub. L. No. 114-95, § 9212(d)(5), 129 Stat. 1802, 
2154 (2015). 
 86.  See Paul Manna & Laura L. Ryan, Competitive Grants and Education Federalism: 
President Obama’s Race to the Top Program in Theory and Practice, 41 PUBLIUS 522, 523 
(2011). 
MCWALTERS_MACROS.DOCM (DO NOT DELETE) 4/10/2019  12:12 PM 
BYU Education & Law Journal [2019 
36 
 
ful to the spirit of cooperative federalism.87 The competitive 
grant paradigm is not completely without detractors who claim 
they infringe on state autonomy.88 However, the assertion that 
states can be compelled into applying to new competitive grant 
programs has thus far been unavailing, both politically and in 
court.89 The political feasibility of the competitive grant model 
as a means to promote UPK is best evidenced by the recent 
creation of the Preschool Development Grants program, which 
was approved as part of the bipartisan Every Student Succeeds 
Act by a Republican-controlled Congress,90 and has been de-
scribed as a precursor to Obama’s proposed Preschool for All.91 
Theoretically, competitive grants have the most limited 
potential to make a broad impact. Some jurisdictions will 
choose not to participate in the program, and even many juris-
dictions that do apply will not be awarded funds.92 However, a 
competitive grant program can have a profound impact for 
those grantees truly acting as willing partners.93 By awarding 
 
 87.  Omari Scott Simmons, Lost in Transition: The Implications of Social Capital for 
Higher Education Access, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 205, 235-36 (2011). 
 88.  Shannon K. McGovern, Note, A New Model for States as Laboratories for Reform: 
How Federalism Informs Education Policy, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1519, 1536-41 (2011). 
 89.  See Jindal v. United States Dep’t of Educ., No. CV 14-534-SDD-RLB, 2015 WL 
5474290, at *11 (M.D. La. Sept. 16, 2015) (summarizing one state’s arguments against the Race 
to the Top program before dispensing with them and finding the program a valid exercise of 
the Spending Clause power). 
 90.  Every Student Succeeds Act, Pub. L. No. 114-95, 129 Stat. 1802 (2015). 
 91.  OFF. OF THE PRESS SECRETARY, THE WHITE HOUSE, FACT SHEET: THE 
PRESIDENT’S FISCAL YEAR 2017 BUDGET, 2016 WL 491300, at *5; OFF. OF THE PRESS 
SECRETARY, THE WHITE HOUSE, FACT SHEET: OBAMA ADMINISTRATION RECORD FOR 
WOMEN AND GIRLS (2014), 2014 WL 4198372, at *3. The Preschool Development Grants 
awarded funds from a substantially smaller pool of $250 million to states to be used to bolster 
the state’s education administration capacities. Funds were to be used for conducting assess-
ments of the state’s current ECE system, developing plans for coordinating existing programs, 
disseminating information to parents, and sharing best practices among ECE providers within 
the state. Pub. L. No. 114-95, § 9212(f), 129 Stat. at 2155-56. 
 92.  How design choices of a competitive grant program might affect both how many 
states apply and what portion of applicant states are awarded funds is a worthwhile subject that 
is, regrettably, beyond the scope of this paper. 
 93.  In defending the Race to the Top program, the Obama administration frequently 
noted that, while the number of states impacted was limited, the program promoted systemic 
reform in those states awarded funds. OFF. OF THE PRESS SECRETARY, THE WHITE HOUSE, 
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funds to those jurisdictions where conditions are most favorable 
to achieving a specific policy goal, competitive grant programs 
concentrate funding where it is most likely to have type of 
meaningful impact sought.94 Formula grant programs, by con-
trast, can be accused of “throw[ing] good money after bad” in a 
quixotic attempt to foster reform in states with very different 
priorities.95 
A competitive grant program can also have a construc-
tive impact on those jurisdictions that are not awarded funds, as 
the work done by applicant-jurisdictions to prepare a competi-
tive application can, itself, spur reform.96 Ultimately, a competi-
tive grant program may even provide a reform impetus to those 
jurisdictions that initially refrained from applying, as the im-
plementation of UPK in neighboring jurisdictions increases the 
pressure on policymakers in jurisdictions without UPK.97 If one 
competitive grant program is successful in boosting grantee ca-
pacity and producing self-sustaining UPK systems in some ju-
risdictions, subsequent iterations can also be modified to ad-
dress the conditions that led other jurisdictions to miss out or 
refrain from applying.98 
 
FACT SHEET: THE RACE TO THE TOP (2009), 2009 WL 3637744, at *1. 
 94.  See Paul Manna & Laura L. Ryan, Competitive Grants and Education Federalism: 
President Obama’s Race to the Top Program in Theory and Practice, 41 PUBLIUS 522, 532 
(2011). This contention is also a response, though not a solution, to one of the common cri-
tiques of competitive grant programs: that they reward with capacity-enhancing funds those 
grantees that are able to compete effectively because they already boast high capacity. Id. at 
533. While the dilemma is vexing, the answer is not to award funds from a limited pool to 
grantees that are operating at too great a capacity-deficit and cannot plausibly be expected to 
achieve the impact sought. 
 95.  Joseph P. Viteritti, The Federal Role in School Reform: Obama’s “Race to the 
Top”, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2087, 2106 (2012). 
 96.  See id. at 2103; Manna & Ryan, supra note 94, at 530, 532; Ruth Marcus, Civil 
Rights Groups Are Picking the Wrong Fight with President Obama, WASH. POST, July 30, 
2010, at A21. 
 97.  Manna & Ryan, supra note 94, at 527. 
 98.  The Race to the Top program had subsequent rounds of awards, and many states 
were able to capitalize on the work they did in preparation for the first round to secure an 
award. Viteritti, supra note 95, at 2103. The Preschool Development Grant program bifurcated 
its applicant pool, earmarking a portion of funds for states with “either small or no State Pre-
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The competitive grant model cannot achieve nation-
wide UPK with one fell swoop. However, many national policy 
shifts, including ones in education,99 have occurred when suc-
cessful reform in a select few states or cities generated a mo-
mentum that snowballed as more jurisdictions followed suit.100 
By targeting funds towards those states most likely to achieve 
UPK reform, a competitive grant program could push UPK 
towards a tipping point beyond which it becomes a national 
priority. Considering the legal and political constraints sur-
rounding other models of federal intervention, the opportunity 
to make such an impact is one UPK advocates should not pass 
up. 
 
b. Choosing the Applicant Field: States vs. LEAs 
 
Opting to pursue UPK reform using a competitive grant 
model that does not purport to produce nation-wide coverage 
raises another important design question: whether the program 
should solicit applications from and award funds to states or in-
dividual school districts, also known as local education agencies 
(LEAs). Recent history demonstrates that both states and LEAs 
can be effective drivers of UPK reform. Since the 1980s many 
states have taken the lead in expanding access to preschool,101 
and several states have succeeded in implementing renowned 
 
school Programs.” Applications for New Awards; Preschool Development Grants – Develop-
ment Grants, 79 Fed. Reg. 48854, 48854 (Aug. 18, 2014). 
 99.  See NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., OVERVIEW AND 
INVENTORY OF STATE EDUCATION REFORMS: 1990 TO 2000 2-3 (2003) (summarizing several 
educational reforms that saw widespread adoption amongst the states). 
 100.  Alex Tribou & Keith Collins, This is How Fast America Changes Its Mind, 
BLOOMBERG (June 26, 2015), https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/2015-pace-of-social-
change/. 
 101.  DAVID L. KIRP, THE SANDBOX INVESTMENT 219 (2007); Anne W. Mitchell, Mod-
els for Financing State-Supported Prekindergarten Programs, THE PROMISE OF PRE-K, supra 
note 28, 51, 52. 
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UPK systems.102 In more recent decades, LEAs in several big 
cities, some of which serve a population exceeding those of en-
tire states, have successfully implemented comprehensive UPK 
systems, even as their states drag their legislative feet.103 
The federal government could conceivably provide both 
states and LEAs pursuing UPK reform the opportunity to avail 
themselves of federal funds through complementary programs. 
The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act, for instance, 
included two competitive grant programs focused on educa-
tion.104 The Race to the Top program awarded funds to states 
to pursue statewide reform,105 while the Investing in Innovation 
program provided an opportunity for ambitious LEAs to secure 
funds without having to rely on their state’s ability to secure a 
grant.106 Another possibility is designing a grant program to 
produce a hybrid applicant pool that includes both states and 
LEAs of certain sizes. However, opting for a hybrid approach 
has some potentially serious drawbacks, including the possibil-
ity of political strife resulting from the delineation of non-
eligible LEAs107 and friction among LEAs and states over dif-
fering application priorities.108  
 
 102.  See infra Part IV. 
 103.  Lillian Mongeau, What Boston’s Preschools Get Right, THE ATLANTIC, Aug. 2, 
2016, http://www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/2016/08/what-bostons-preschools-get-
right/493952/; Kate Taylor, New York City Will Offer Free Preschool for All 3-Year-Olds, 
N.Y. TIMES, April 24, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/24/nyregion/de-blasio-pre-k-
expansion.html. 
 104.  American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115 
(2009). 
 105.  See id. §§ 14005(c), 14006. 
 106.  See id. § 14007. 
 107.  Eloise Pasachoff, Block Grants, Early Childhood Education, and the Reauthoriza-
tion of Head Start: From Positional Conflict to Interest-Based Agreement, 111 PENN ST. L. 
REV. 349, 355-56 (2006) (chronicling the demise of the Comprehensive Child Development 
Act of 1971). 
 108.  The situation is somewhat analogous to the decision of several California LEAs to 
apply for a No Child Left Behind waiver when the state refused to comply with some of the 
requirements necessary to receive a waiver. See Michele McNeil & Lesli A. Maxwell, Critics 
Blast Away at California Districts’ Waiver, EDUC. WEEK, Aug. 16, 2013, 
http://www.edweek.org/ew/articles/2013/08/16/01corewaiver.h33.html. 
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If we assume that complementary or hybrid programs 
are not politically viable, choosing one applicant pool over the 
other entails tradeoffs that need to be examined. Grants to 
states neglect those LEAs within states that do not prioritize 
UPK reform. LEAs seeking to implement district-wide UPK 
will be precluded from receiving grant funds by a state that 
submits a weak application or declines to apply at all. Grants to 
LEAs, on the other hand, put smaller LEAs, which tend to be 
located outside of major metropolitan areas, at a disad-
vantage.109 These smaller LEAs, which would benefit from im-
plementation of statewide UPK, are unlikely to have the capaci-
ty to compete effectively with larger LEAs. Though the 
capacity conundrum, in which entities more in need of capaci-
ty-building funds are often less likely to receive them,110 is an 
issue for both state and LEA-focused competitive grant pro-
grams,111 the problem is likely more acute when LEAs compete 
for funds because the difference in capacity is generally more 
drastic among LEAs than among states.112 
While LEAs pursuing UPK implementation would be 
hindered by exclusion from a new federal grant program, they 
would not be completely without recourse. The recently-
enacted Every Student Succeeds Act clarifies that LEAs can use 
the funds they receive under Title I of ESEA for preschool,113 
 
 109.  Debra Lyn Bassett, Ruralism, 88 IOWA L. REV. 273, 323 (2003); Deena Dulgerian, 
Note, The Impact of the Every Student Succeeds Act on Rural Schools, 24 GEO. J. ON 
POVERTY L. & POL’Y 111, 127–28 (2016). 
 110.  Paul Manna & Laura L. Ryan, Competitive Grants and Education Federalism: Pres-
ident Obama’s Race to the Top Program in Theory and Practice, 41 PUBLIUS 522, 533 (2011). 
 111.  See supra note 94 and accompanying text. 
 112.  LORRAINE M. MCDONNELL & MILBREY W. MCLAUGHLIN, EDUCATION POLICY 
AND THE ROLE OF THE STATES 153 (1982) (noting that even the lowest capacity state educa-
tion agencies are capable of providing significant services to LEAs); James P. Spillane & 
Charles L. Thompson, Reconstructing Conceptions of Local Capacity, 19 EDUCATIONAL 
EVALUATION AND POLICY ANALYSIS 185 (1997) (describing the significant variability among 
nine Michigan LEAs chosen for its study). 
 113.  20 U.S.C. § 7931 (2012); Christina A. Samuels, Law Adds to Pre-K’s Stature as 
Federal-State Policy, EDUC. WEEK, Jan. 5, 2016, http://www.edweek.org/ew/articles/2016/ 
01/06/law-adds-to-pre-ks-stature-as-federal-state.html. 
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and state plans are now required to describe how a state will as-
sist LEAs that choose to use their funds for ECE programs.114 
Though it is unclear how these provisions will function in prac-
tice, they should, at the very least, provide some measure of ac-
countability for a state’s efforts to assist LEA-UPK efforts. 
Granting funds to states, ultimately, makes sense as a 
matter of scale. Considering the nearly insurmountable obsta-
cles that would impede federal implementation of nation-wide 
UPK,115 states are the highest level government entity that can 
implement a UPK system. The federal government can there-
fore expand access to preschool most efficiently by working 
with states. With over 13,000 LEAs in the U.S. and only 50 
states, single instances of successful UPK implementation on a 
statewide level would result in district-wide UPK for, on aver-
age, over 260 LEAs. 
 
IV.THE STATE-LEVEL PROCESS OF CREATING UPK 
 
When designing a competitive grant program that pro-
vides funds to states pursuing UPK reform, policymakers 
should identify those circumstances that are most conducive to 
successful state-level implementation of UPK. In identifying 
these conditions, much can be learned by examining the history 
of UPK’s enactment in the first three states to implement it, 
Georgia, Oklahoma, and Florida. 
 
a. Success Story – Georgia 
 
In 1995, Georgia became the first state to offer publicly-
funded preschool for all four-year-olds.116 Georgia should be 
 
 114.  20 U.S.C. § 6311(g)(1)(A) (2012). 
 115.  See supra notes 71-73 and accompanying text. 
 116.  W. STEVEN BARNETT ET. AL, NAT’L INST. FOR EARLY EDUC. RES., THE STATE 
OF PRESCHOOL: 2015 69 (2016); GA. COMP. R. & REGS. 591-2-1-.01(1) (West 2017). 
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looked to as an exemplar because its UPK program has proven 
to be stable and of high quality. Georgia UPK has endured 
through more than two decades and partisan shifts in both the 
Governor’s office and the General Assembly.117 The program 
is, by all accounts, here to stay, garnering wide support from 
the public and both political parties in the state.118 Georgia 
UPK has many of the characteristics that distinguish an early 
childhood education program as high quality,119 including its 
comprehensive learning standards,120 rigorous teacher require-
ments,121 and small class sizes.122 Funding for Georgia’s UPK 
has, for the most part, steadily risen.123 Most importantly, 
Georgia’s UPK has produced good educational outcomes for its 
young citizens. Research shows that Georgia UPK resulted in 
significantly better school readiness across a wide variety of 
skills.124 These gains were evident among the subset of low-
income children, as well as the overall study population.125 
Georgia UPK can be traced back to a campaign promise 
made in 1989 by Zell Miller, who was then a Democratic can-
didate for governor. Miller campaigned on a plan to legalize 
lottery games within the state and earmark all proceeds for edu-
 
 117.  Fawn Johnson, How Georgia Got Republicans and Democrats to Embrace Univer-
sal Pre-K, THE ATLANTIC, (May 7, 2014), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2014/ 
05/how-georgia-got-republicans-and-democrats-to-embrace-universal-pre-k/430899/. 
 118.  Id.; see also ELIZABETH ROSE, THE PROMISE OF PRESCHOOL: FROM HEAD START 
TO UNIVERSAL PRE-KINDERGARTEN 109 (2010) (citing as an example of state pride an Atlanta 
Journal-Constitution article that states: “For generations, the South followed the lead of Mas-
sachusetts and other states in innovative, forward-looking programs. With Pre-K, we’re on 
top.”). 
 119.  BARNETT ET. AL, supra note 116, at 70. 
 120.  GA. COMP. R. & REGS. 591-1-1.03. 
 121.  Id. § 591-1-1-.31. 
 122.  Id. § 591-1-1-.32. 
 123.  Governor’s Budget Report Documents, GOVERNOR’S OFF. OF PLAN. AND 
BUDGET, http://opb.georgia.gov/governors-budget-report-documents (last visited Mar. 31, 
2017). 
 124.  ELLEN S. PEISNER-FEINBERG ET AL., FPG CHILD DEV. INST., THE UNIV. OF 
N.C. AT CHAPEL HILL, EFFECTS OF GA.’S PRE-K PROGRAM ON CHILDREN’S SCH. 
READINESS SKILLS 12 (2014). 
 125.  Id. 
MCWALTERS_MACROS.DOCM (DO NOT DELETE) 4/10/2019  12:12 PM 
1] The Federal Role in Universal Pre-K 
43 
 
cation programs.126 Miller would later elaborate on these plans 
by detailing two education programs to be funded by lottery 
taxes: a scholarship fund for accomplished Georgia high school 
graduates and a preschool program for low-income children.127 
Though the establishment of a lottery was opposed by politi-
cians and influential religious organizations, the proposal had 
wide support among the voting public.128 Miller made the “Lot-
tery for Education” the central platform of his campaign, and it 
propelled him to easy victories in both the Democratic primary 
and the general election.129 
After assuming office in the beginning of 1991, Gover-
nor Miller needed to execute some nimble political maneuver-
ing to realize his campaign vision. Establishing the Lottery for 
Education would require both a legislative act and an amend-
ment to the state constitution, which prohibited lottery games 
at the time.130 The constitutional amendment required a refer-
endum vote, in addition to a two-thirds majority in the state 
legislature.131 Once again, a coalition of influential entities 
formed to oppose the lottery.132 In response, Miller formed a 
pro-amendment coalition, which was supported by powerful 
business interests.133 The narrow margin by which the amend-
ment passed134 evinces the success the anti-lottery coalition had 
in undermining what had previously been wide support, and the 
necessity of forming a pro-lottery coalition. 
 
 126.  ANTHONY RADEN, FOUND. FOR CHILD DEV., UNIVERSAL PREKINDERGARTEN IN 
GEORGIA – A CASE STUDY OF GEORGIA’S LOTTERY-FUNDED PRE-K PROGRAM 58 (1999); 
ROSE, supra note 9, at 105. 
 127.  RADEN, supra note 126, at 12. 
 128.  Id. at 9. 
 129.  Id. at 11-12; BRENDA K. BUSHOUSE, UNIVERSAL PRESCHOOL: POLICY CHANGE, 
STABILITY, AND THE PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS 24-25 (2009). 
 130.  RADEN, supra note 126, at 12. 
 131.  Id.; GA. CONST. art. X, § 1, ¶ II. 
 132.  RADEN, supra note 126, at 12. 
 133.  Id. at 12-13. 
 134.  Id. at 13. 
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Additional political maneuvering was required even after 
approval of the constitutional amendment. Miller needed to co-
ax into agreement legislators who proposed using the lottery 
funds for different types of educational expenditures, rather 
than a new preschool program.135 Relying on his mandate from 
the voters, Miller eventually succeeded in enacting a bill that 
funded the programs he had promised, among them public pre-
school for low-income children.136 In June of 1993, almost two 
and a half years after Miller assumed office, the Lottery for Ed-
ucation finally opened.137 
In 1994, with the Lottery for Education generating vast-
ly more revenue than expected, Miller decided to expand Geor-
gia’s pre-k program to provide universal access.138 Hearing 
rumblings from constituents not eligible under Georgia’s initial 
targeted pre-k regime, Miller believed that such a move was 
necessary to ensure the program’s survival.139 In its first years, 
Georgia’s pre-k was, in fact, assailed by Republican legislators, 
who were ultimately unable to garner the political capital need-
ed to pass amending legislation,140 as was necessary to change 
pre-k’s statutorily-embedded funding mechanism.141 Only after 
Miller’s Executive Secretary for Health and Education staged 
an extensive public relations campaign to recapture support 
from a newly-expanded cohort of eligible constituents did re-
curring attempts to scale back pre-k cease.142 
 
 135.  Id. 
 136.  Id. 
 137.  Id. 
 138.  RADEN, supra note 126, at 25. 
 139.  Id; ELIZABETH ROSE, THE PROMISE OF PRESCHOOL: FROM HEAD START TO 
UNIVERSAL PRE-KINDERGARTEN 108 (2010). 
 140.  RADEN, supra note 126, at 32. 
 141.  See GA. CONST. art. I, § 2, ¶ VIII(c)(2); GA. CODE ANN. § 20-1A-1 (2016); id. § 
20-1A-4. 
 142.  RADEN, supra note 126, at 32, 33; ROSE, supra note 139, at 108; BUSHOUSE, supra 
note 11, at 64-65. 
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In its incipiency, Georgia’s pre-k program also faced ex-
istential threats from other entities. Before its expansion to uni-
versal access, Georgia pre-k had to resolve political tensions 
with Head Start providers in the state who felt the new pro-
gram would marginalize Head Start and its historical role as 
part of the Civil Rights movement.143 Only after Miller’s team 
remedied the absence of Head Start as a stakeholder in the pre-
k coalition, and all parties realized that “there were plenty of at-
risk four-year-olds and three-year-olds to go around,” did this 
tension dissipate.144 
Miller’s team also believed the powerful child care in-
dustry lobby could have thwarted expansion to universal access 
if it felt UPK would threaten the viability of private ECE pro-
viders.145 Involving these private providers in a public-private 
partnership, making them eligible for pre-k grants, turned po-
tentially powerful opponents into partners.146 This move also 
alleviated some vexing logistical problems for UPK by vastly 
expanding the state’s access to preexisting facilities.147 
 
b. Success Story – Oklahoma 
 
Like UPK in Georgia, Oklahoma’s program should be 
looked to as a model for establishing sustainable and impactful 
UPK. Oklahoma UPK, created in 1998, has endured almost as 
long as Georgia’s program. Though the partisan make-up of 
the state legislature has shifted significantly, from a sizeable 
Democratic majority at the time of the bill’s passage to what is 
currently an overwhelming Republican majority,148 UPK re-
 
 143.  RADEN, supra note 126, at 20. 
 144.  Id. at 21. 
 145.  Id. at 22-23; ROSE, supra note 139, at 107. 
 146.  RADEN, supra note 126, at 23; ROSE, supra note 139, at 107. 
 147.  RADEN, supra note 126, at 22; ROSE, supra note 139, at 107. 
 148.  See State Senate Since Statehood, OKLA. ST. LEGISLATURE, 
http://www.oksenate.gov/senators/ historic_members/state_senate_historical.PDF (last visited 
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mains on solid ground. Preschool in Oklahoma is not a partisan 
issue over which legislators tussle.149 Rather, it is a point of 
pride that transcends state politics.150 
Oklahoma UPK serves 75% of the state’s four-year-
olds, trailing only Vermont and Florida among U.S. states.151 
Oklahoma UPK has many of the earmarks of a quality pro-
gram.152 Notably, Oklahoma seeks to ensure an adequate supply 
of qualified preschool teachers, who must hold a bachelor’s de-
gree and complete an early childhood certification,153 by codify-
ing strict salary-schedule parity with K-3 teachers.154 Funding 
for pre-k is calculated algorithmically, with a portion of the 
overall education budget being allotted based on the number of 
preschool-aged children in each district.155 Consequently, UPK 
cannot be separated from other items in the education budget 
and disproportionately reduced through the appropriations 
process. A study of the state’s largest school district found that 
participating four year-olds, particularly those from disadvan-
taged backgrounds, were months ahead, in terms of school 
readiness, than those who did not participate.156 Gains were ev-
ident not only in reading, writing, and math, but also in 
measures of attentiveness and other socio-emotional factors.157 
 
Mar. 31, 2017); House of Representatives: Historic Members, OKLA. ST. LEGISLATURE, 
http://www.okhouse.gov/Members/Historic.aspx (last visited Mar. 31, 2017). 
 149.  Lillian Mongeau, Why Oklahoma’s public preschools are some of the best in the 
country, THE HECHINGER REP., (February 2, 2016), https://hechingerreport.org/why-
oklahomas-public-preschools-are-some-of-the-best-in-the-country/; Nicholas Kristof, Okla-
homa! Where the Kids Learn Early, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2013/11/10/opinion/sunday/kristof-oklahoma-where-the-kids-learn-early.html. 
 150.  MONGEAU, supra note 149. 
 151.  W. STEVEN BARNETT ET. AL, NAT’L INST. FOR EARLY EDUC. RES., THE STATE 
OF PRESCHOOL: 2015 133 (2016); GA. COMP. R. & REGS. 591-2-1-.01(1) (West 2017). 
 152.  Id. at 134. 
 153.  OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, § 11-103.7(B) (West 2017). 
 154.  Id. § 18-114.14. 
 155.  Id. §§ 18-200.1(A), 18-201.1(B)(1). 
 156.  WILLIAM T. GORMELY JR., GEORGETOWN PUBLIC POLICY REVIEW, 
OKLAHOMA’S UNIVERSAL PRESCHOOL PROGRAM: BETTER THAN OK (2013). 
 157.  Id. 
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To the extent that Oklahoma’s UPK was created 
through “political sleight of hand,”158 its use as a model for 
state-level processes is limited. Representative Joe Eddins’ abil-
ity to shepherd his UPK bill through a less-than-heedful legis-
lature and secure the votes of lawmakers unaware of the bill’s 
impact is not something that can or should be readily replicated 
in other states.159 However, the creation of Oklahoma’s UPK is 
also attributable to more exemplary conditions, such as institu-
tional knowledge, expansive networks, and well-managed pub-
licity. 
Eddins’ early attempts to get education bills passed end-
ed in frustrating failure.160 As an inexperienced lawmaker, Ed-
dins believed the viability of a bill would depend on its spon-
sor’s ability to articulate its efficacy during floor debates.161 
Instead, he found that legislators needed to garner support 
through casual advocacy prior to a bill’s introduction.162 The 
political know-how that Eddins acquired as a result of these ex-
periences proved crucial to his ability to get his UPK bill enact-
ed.163 
Eddins also knew how to court allies and soften poten-
tial opposition. When drafting his UPK bill, Eddins worked 
with a representative of the Tulsa Chamber of Commerce, who 
believed that UPK was a means to address workforce develop-
ment concerns.164 Eddins also cultivated relationships with 
Head Start and private daycare providers, which helped to en-
 
 158.  CHRISTIAN M. BELL, THE CURIOUS CASE OF OKLAHOMA: A HISTORICAL 
ANALYSIS OF THE PASSAGE OF UNIVERSAL PRE-KINDERGARTEN LEGISLATION IN 
OKLAHOMA 60 (May 2013), https://repositories.lib.utexas.edu/ handle/2152/20937. 
 159.  Id. 
 160.  Id. at 55; BRENDA K. BUSHOUSE, UNIVERSAL PRESCHOOL: POLICY CHANGE, 
STABILITY, AND THE PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS 41 (2009). 
 161.  Bell, supra note 158, at 60-61. 
 162.  Id. 
 163.  Id. at 60; BUSHOUSE, supra note 160, at 41. 
 164.  Bell, supra note 158, at 56-58; BUSHOUSE, supra note 160, at 40-41. 
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sure that his bill provoked minimal external opposition.165 Last-
ly, Eddins tailored his pitch for Oklahoma’s Republican gover-
nor, who signed the bill into law with little fanfare.166 
Whereas Miller utilized a public relations campaign to 
ensure continued support for Georgia’s UPK, Eddins, also 
cognizant of a new UPK program’s fragility, consciously avoid-
ed publicity.167 At a time when Oklahoma’s education budget 
was growing, the dilution of preexisting education funds did not 
draw much negative attention.168 Oklahoma’s UPK managed to 
stay under the radar as a political issue while attendance in the 
program steadily grew.169 The program finally came to the fore-
front of the public’s consciousness in 2004, when a major study 
ranked Oklahoma as the best state in the country in terms of 
access to state-funded preschool.170 The sense of pride generat-
ed by this recognition solidified the political viability of Okla-
homa’s UPK program.171 
 
c. A Cautionary Tale – Florida 
  
In 2005, Florida became the third state to implement 
UPK. Florida UPK, known as the Voluntary Prekindergarten 
Education Program (VPK), currently serves 76% of the state’s 
four year-olds, second only to Vermont among U.S. states.172 
 
 165.  Bell, supra note 158, at 61-62; BUSHOUSE, supra note160, at 43, 45. 
 166.  Bell, supra note 158, at 65; BUSHOUSE, supra note 160, at 47; see also ELIZABETH 
ROSE, THE PROMISE OF PRESCHOOL: FROM HEAD START TO UNIVERSAL PRE-
KINDERGARTEN 112 (2010) (chronicling the governors vetoing of preceding education bills). 
 167.  Bell, supra note 158, at 65-66; ROSE, supra note 166, at 114. 
 168.  WILLIAM T. GORMELY JR. & DEBORAH PHILLIPS, THE EFFECTS OF UNIVERSAL 
PRE-K IN OKLAHOMA: RESEARCH HIGHLIGHTS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 5 (2003); ROSE, 
supra note 166, at 114. 
 169.  Bell, supra note 158, at 67. 
 170.  Id. 
 171.  Id.; Lillian Mongeau, Why Oklahoma’s public preschools are some of the best in the 
country, THE HECHINGER REP., (February 2, 2016), https://hechingerreport.org/why-
oklahomas-public-preschools-are-some-of-the-best-in-the-country/. 
 172.  W. STEVEN BARNETT ET. AL, NAT’L INST. FOR EARLY EDUC. RES., THE STATE 
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However, Florida’s VPK differs in some important respects 
from UPK in Georgia and Oklahoma, and these differences 
militate against using Florida as a model for UPK implementa-
tion. Unlike Georgia (with its lottery funding) or Oklahoma 
(with its statutory algorithm), preschool funding in Florida is 
determined solely through the annual legislative appropriations 
process.173 This likely explains, in part, why preschool funding 
remains a contentious issue.174 Despite an all-time high budget 
in 2016, Florida’s preschool spending remained flat,175 and per-
child spending has steadily dropped since the program’s third 
year.176 The total spending per preschool-enrolled child in 
Florida is $2,304, about 60% of what Georgia and Oklahoma 
spend per child.177 
Given its relatively low level of funding, it is unsurpris-
ing that Florida’s VPK is lacking in many of the quality indica-
tors present in Georgia and Oklahoma.178 Most notably, teach-
ers in the year-long VPK program are not required to hold a 
bachelor’s degree, but rather only a child development associate 
credential.179 Florida law also only provides for three-hour 
days,180 compared with six or more hours provided by the UPK 
programs in Georgia and Oklahoma.181 Public perception of 
 
OF PRESCHOOL: 2015 9, 67 (2016). 
 173.  Id. at 67. 
 174.  See Scott Maxwell, Florida’s Pre-K Cuts Hurt Kids, Ignore Voters’ Mandate, 
ORLANDO SENTINEL, May 4, 2016, http://www.orlandosentinel.com/opinion/os-florida-pre-
k-scott-maxwell-20160504-column.html. 
 175.  Leslie Postal, Flat Funding Frustrates Preschool Advocates, ORLANDO SENTINEL, 
April 4, 2016, http://www.orlandosentinel.com/features/education/os-pre-k-florida-budget-
spending-flat-20160404-story.html. 
 176.  DAPHNA BASSOK ET AL., UNIV. OF VA., EDPOLICYWORKS, FLORIDA’S 
VOLUNTARY PRE-KINDERGARTEN PROGRAM: AN OVERVIEW OF THE LARGEST STATE PRE-
SCHOOL PROGRAM IN THE NATION 8 (2014). 
 177.  BARNETT ET. AL, supra note 172, at 68, 70, 134. Georgia and Oklahoma spend 
$3,880 and $3,709, respectively, per child. 
 178.  Id. at 68. 
 179.  FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 1002.55(3)(c), 1002.63(4) (West 2017). 
 180.  FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 6M-8.204(3) (2017), 
 181.  GA. COMP. R. & REGS. 591-2-1-.01(1) (West 2017); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, § 
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Florida VPK’s mediocrity is widespread, though not unani-
mous.182 However, flawed data-collection mechanisms have 
limited researchers’ ability to study the impact VPK has on par-
ticipating children,183 leaving quantifiable inputs as the best 
available heuristic for assessing the efficacy of VPK. 
The impetus for Florida’s VPK was provided not by a 
politician but rather by the state’s citizens, who passed, with 
almost 60% of the vote,184 a 2002 ballot referendum that man-
dated the state legislature to provide for universal preschool by 
2005.185 This mandate specified that this program be “estab-
lished according to high quality standards.”186 What was not 
specified was how this program would be funded, though the 
referendum did proscribe diverting existing educational 
funds.187 
The ballot initiative was not without politically-savvy 
advocates; then-Executive Mayor of Miami-Dade County Alex 
Penelas, as well as former Miami Herald Publisher David Law-
rence Jr., played a substantial role in enshrining the UPK man-
date in the state’s constitution.188 However, after the ballot ini-
tiative passed, both champions found themselves on the outside 
of the ensuing legislative process. The Florida legislature, 
which had previously balked at legislation that would have cre-
 
11-103.7(B) (West 2017). 
 182.  Denise S. Amos, Study: Florida’s Preschool Funding, Quality are Below National 
Standards, FLA. TIMES-UNION, May 11, 2015, http://jacksonville.com/news/metro/2015-05-
11/story/study-floridas-preschool-funding-quality-are-below-national-standards#. 
 183.  Chester E. Finn Jr., Voluntary Pre-Kindergarten, in REFORMING EDUCATION IN 
FLORIDA 229, 237-38 (Paul E. Peterson ed. 2006). 
 184.  JIM HAMPTON, FOUNDATION FOR CHILD DEVELOPMENT, HOW FLORIDA’S 
VOTERS ENACTED UPK WHEN THEIR LEGISLATURE WOULDN’T 10 (2004). 
 185.  Id. at 8. 
 186.  FLA. CONST. art. IX, § 1(b) 
 187.  Id. § 1(c); Linda A. White et al., Policy Logics, Framing Strategies, and Policy 
Change: Lessons from Universal Pre-K Policy Debates in California and Florida, 48 POLICY 
SCI. 395, 408 (2015). 
 188.  HAMPTON, supra note 184, at 3; ROSE, supra note 9, at 163. 
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ated UPK,189 was slow to act on this mandate. Mired in a budg-
et crisis, the legislature spent little effort contouring a UPK 
program in 2003.190 The legislature did commission a Universal 
Prekindergarten Education Advisory Council to research policy 
options and make recommendations.191 
However, in 2004 the legislature, not yet out from un-
der the budget crisis,192 was more concerned with frugally get-
ting out from under the UPK mandate than incorporating rec-
ommendations meant to ensure quality. The first bare-bones 
UPK bill to pass the legislature generated public criticism for 
its minimal standards, and was vetoed by the governor in July of 
2004.193 In December, in a special legislative session, lawmakers 
passed another UPK bill that, while less austere than the previ-
ous iteration, was still criticized by Democrats and education 
advocates for ignoring many of the council’s recommenda-
tions.194 However, with the referendum-imposed deadline for 
implementing UPK fast approaching, the governor signed this 
bill into law.195 
 
V. DESIGNING A FEDERAL GRANT PROGRAM TO 
CULTIVATE UPK 
 
While previous federal ECE programs have often waded 
into the complicated and contentious business of promulgating 
specific quality standards,196 the preceding part demonstrates 
 
 189.  HAMPTON, supra note 184, at 5. 
 190.  Id. at 14. 
 191.  White et al., supra note 187, at 409. 
 192.  BARBARA A. ORMOND, THE URBAN INST., STATE RESPONSES TO BUDGET CRISES 
IN 2004: FLORIDA (2004). 
 193.  White et al., supra note 187, at 409; ROSE, supra note 9, at 163. 
 194.  White et al., supra note 187, at 409; ROSE, supra note 9, at 163. 
 195.  White et al., supra note 187, at 409. 
 196.  For instance, while few would question that teacher experience is important to 
quality, there is a vigorous debate about whether some certification requirements in some juris-
dictions are too high and actually create a dearth of eligible teachers, hurting the quality of a 
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that states are quite capable of making optimal design choices 
when certain conditions are present. The history of UPK’s cre-
ation in Georgia, Oklahoma, and Florida, and the subsequent 
trajectory of their respective programs illuminate three circum-
stances that are crucial to successful implementation of high-
quality UPK: a diverse group of stakeholders advocating for 
UPK, strong grassroots support for UPK, and the availability 
of a funding mechanism that is not vulnerable to expedient re-
ductions. Any competitive federal grant program should be 
cognizant of these factors and incorporate them into the appli-
cation process. 
 
a. Involving Stakeholders from a Broad Range of Back-
grounds 
 
The stories of UPK’s inception in Georgia, Oklahoma, 
and Florida demonstrate the importance of collaboration 
among a range of stakeholders. While the state education agen-
cies (SEAs) that complete applications for education grant pro-
grams can be presumed to possess expertise on matters of edu-
cation policy, history suggests that successful implementation 
of UPK requires additional sorts of expertise usually outside of 
an SEA’s institutional competence. The champions of UPK in 
Georgia and Oklahoma were both deft politicians first and edu-
cation advocates second, while in Florida the absence of any 
such figure, at least after the ballot initiative passed, is conspic-
uous. Collaboration with individuals or entities possessing ex-
pertise in the state’s political processes is crucial to putting edu-
cation policy theory into practice. A federal UPK grant 
 
preschool system as a whole. Michael Alison Chandler, D.C. Among First in Nation to Require 
Child-Care Workers to Get College Degrees, WASH. POST, Mar. 31, 2017, 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/social-issues/district-among-the-first-in-nation-to-
require-child-care-workers-to-get-college-degrees/2017/03/30/d7d59e18-0fe9-11e7-9d5a-
a83e627dc120_story.html. 
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program should compel SEAs to work with such parties and 
reward those SEAs that do so. 
SEAs involving Head Start administrators, private pre-
school providers, and other groups that would be affected the 
implementation of UPK should likewise be encouraged. Coop-
erating with these parties in Georgia, Oklahoma, and Florida 
preempted some potentially powerful opposition and ensured 
fewer obstacles on the path to UPK implementation. 
Previous educational grant programs have heeded stake-
holder involvement. Applicants for the Preschool Development 
Grants (PDG) were asked to demonstrate that their plans for 
preschool expansion were “supported by a broad group of 
stakeholders”197 and to point to “enacted and pending legisla-
tion, policies, or practices that demonstrate the State’s current 
and future commitment.”198 However, support of stakeholders 
was just one of multiple items to be addressed in the applicant’s 
Executive Summary, which in total was only worth up to 10 of 
a possible 230 points.199 Highlighting legislation and policies 
that evince a commitment to early childhood education was 
worth only four points.200 
These criteria should be given more weight. PDG’s fo-
cus on ensuring quality, which constitute the bulk of available 
points,201 is commendable. However, articulating a plan for en-
suring quality or expanding access is of little use without insti-
tutional know-how to get the plan put into action. Further-
more, a broad coalition that includes early childhood education 
advocates and experts is likely to produce high-quality stand-
 
 197.  Applications for New Awards; Preschool Development Grants – Development 
Grants, 79 Fed. Reg. 48854, 48863 (Aug. 18, 2014). 
 198.  Id. at 48864. 
 199.  Id. at 48868. 
 200.  Id. 
 201.  Id. at 48868-69. 
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ards even without the specter of federal appraisal, as Georgia 
and Oklahoma’s history demonstrates. 
The next federal grant program should also require 
states to do more than merely summarize the support it pur-
ports to have. Bare assertions that a state’s stakeholders include 
“representatives from across the state and from various political 
parties, as well as various state agencies,” as was claimed by one 
state that was awarded funds,202 do not provide a basis for dis-
tinguishing states on the basis of this factor, nor does it compel 
further collaboration. PDG’s predecessor, the Race to the Top 
– Early Learning Challenge, asked states to obtain letters of in-
tent or support from early childhood educators, state legisla-
tors, school boards, representatives of private and faith-based 
early learning programs, and many others.203 Such a criterion is 
more useful for evaluating and cultivating stakeholder collabo-
ration. It is unclear why the Department of Education did not 
likewise seek letters of support for PDG.204 
However, the Department of Education recently created 
a paradigm of stakeholder involvement that is even more prom-
ising. In 2016, the Department promulgated new regulations 
for the state plans required under the Elementary and Second-
ary Education Act, which provides substantial block grant funds 
to states for K-12 education.205 The regulations ensure “timely 
and meaningful consultation with stakeholders” by requiring 
states to solicit and incorporate input from the governor, state 
legislators, community-based and civil rights organizations, and 
 
 202.  ARIZ. DEP’T OF EDUC., ARIZONA APPLICATION FOR FUNDING UNDER 
PRESCHOOL DEVELOPMENT GRANTS – DEVELOPMENT GRANTS 8 (2014). 
 203.  Applications for New Awards; Race to the Top – Early Learning Challenge, 76 Fed. 
Reg. 53564, 53574 (Aug. 26, 2011). 
 204.  Notice and comment rulemaking was waived for the promulgation of the PDG ap-
plication, 79 Fed. Reg. 48854, 48854 (Aug. 18, 2014), and comments otherwise solicited are no 
longer available on ED’s website, https://www2.ed.gov/programs/preschooldevelopmentgrants/ 
resources.html. 
 205.  See 20 U.S.C. § 6301 et seq. (2012). 
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others.206 These regulations, along with many other, were re-
cently nullified by an exercise of the Congressional Review 
Act,207 making such consultation optional for states. It is unclear 
whether this action is at all indicative of partisan hostility to-
wards such requirements or merely part of zealous effort to peel 
back much of the previous administration’s accomplishments. 
The consultation regulations specifically garnered “extensive 
support” during the notice and comment period,208 and state 
plans drafted before their repeal demonstrate how such regula-
tions can successfully beget the meaningful consultation 
sought,209 offering hope that similar requirements will remain 
politically viable in the future. Policymakers designing a federal 
UPK grant program would be wise to replicate this model by 
awarding substantial points to SEAs that conduct and docu-
ment consultations with the statesmen, providers, and ECE ad-
vocates whose involvement has proven to be essential to suc-
cessful UPK implementation. 
 
b. Assessing Grassroots Support 
 
A swell of grassroots support in Georgia and Florida 
were essential to the creation of UPK. Zell Miller’s Lottery for 
Education platform was belittled by opponents and the press, 
but unyielding support from the general public provided Miller 
the mandate he needed to push the program through. In Flori-
da, citizens exercised their power of direct democracy to codify 
a right to UPK after the legislature failed to do so. The resili-
ency of high-quality UPK in Georgia and Oklahoma is also at-
 
 206.  34 C.F.R. §§ 299.13(b), 299.15(a) (2016). 
 207.  Pub. L. No 115-13, 131 Stat. 77 (2017). 
 208.  Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, as Amended by the Every Stu-
dent Succeeds Act – Accountability and State Plans, 81 Fed. Reg. 86076, 86190 (Nov. 29, 
2016). 
 209.  See, e.g., OHIO DEP’T OF EDUC., OHIO DRAFT SUBMISSION FOR PUBLIC 
COMMENT 16-21 (2017). 
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tributable in no small part to the pride cultivated among the 
public after UPK’s implementation. 
No previous ECE federal grant program has considered 
public support or grassroots advocacy as a criterion. However, 
for any future program that contemplates a federal role limited 
to assisting states create their own UPK program, this factor is 
critical. 
One option for cognizing this factor is requiring states 
to articulate how they plan to bolster public support for UPK. 
Such an approach appears to be without precedent among fed-
eral grant programs, and it is not difficult to imagine why. 
Providing federal funds to an SEA to coordinate grassroots 
lobbying activities meant to influence the state legislature pro-
vokes strong federalism concerns and may run afoul federal 
spending restrictions.210 Federal funds have been used to free up 
state resources then used to fund political activity,211 but for any 
federal funds that carry with them explicit instructions on how 
to use state funds, that distinction is illusory. Aside from push-
ing the legal limits of the federal government’s spending power, 
such an approach may provoke counterproductive political 
backlash. Notions of federal meddling in state affairs has prov-
en to be an effective arrow in the quiver of opponents seeking 
to undermine public support for a government spending pro-
gram.212 
This conundrum illustrates the inherent limits of the 
federal government’s power to shape a state’s political priorities 
and provides support to this paper’s contention that UPK is 
 
 210.  Federal regulations generally prohibit federal grantees from using funds for lobby-
ing activities. 2 C.F.R. § 200.450(c) (2016). To what extent grassroots advocacy constitutes lob-
bying activities and how far removed a grantee must be from said activities is unclear. 
 211.  Susan Rose-Ackerman, Cooperative Federalism and Co-Optation, 92 YALE L.J. 
1344, 1344 (1983). 
 212.  Elizabeth Weeks Leonard, Crafting a Narrative for the Red State Option, 102 KY. 
L.J. 381, 408 (2014). 
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best pursued by adhering to the competitive grant model.213 
While Obama envisioned a program which would result in all 
50 states implementing statewide UPK, this goal is at odds with 
his professed affinity for cooperative federalism. Cooperative 
federalism implies that the federal government will assist states 
pursuing some shared goal at the state’s own prerogative, and it 
is unlikely that all 50 states would prioritize UPK. 
To this end, a UPK grant program should require states 
to assess how much public support UPK currently has in the 
state. Requiring states to point to polls and gauge public sup-
port through discussions with advocacy organizations would al-
low the federal government to direct its funds to those states 
that are most conducive to producing the desired result of 
UPK-implementation. These requirements would also have the 
collateral effect of making SEAs more cognizant of the oppor-
tunities or hurdles that public sentiment presents and opening 
up lines of communication between SEAs and advocacy groups 
within the state. Requiring state assessment, then, could also 
encourage states to engage in grassroots advocacy, but in a 
manner less vulnerable to federalism attacks.214 
 
c. Exploring Embedded Funding Mechanisms 
 
In Georgia and Oklahoma, funding mechanisms embed-
ded directly into state law and not subject to the appropriations 
process have assured that UPK continues to receive the funding 
necessary to provide a high-quality ECE. Though these em-
bedded mechanisms are subject to their own fluctuations,215 
 
 213.  See supra Section III.a. 
 214.  See supra notes 87-89 and accompanying text. 
 215.  See Fawn Johnson, How Georgia Got Republicans and Democrats to Embrace 
Universal Pre-K, THE ATLANTIC, (May 7, 2014), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics 
/archive/2014/05/how-georgia-got-republicans-and-democrats-to-embrace-universal-pre-
k/430899/ (describing the state lottery’s economic downturn in 2014 and the subsequent effect 
on the UPK program); GENE PERRY, OK. POLICY INST., OKLAHOMA CONTINUES TO LEAD 
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they have insulated UPK from the more volatile political cur-
rents. Though cutting funding to a new expenditure through 
the appropriations process is normally an expedient means of 
reeling in spending, legislators in Georgia and Oklahoma 
would need to go through the much more onerous process of 
statutory or even constitutional amendment. In contrast, fund-
ing for Florida’s VPK, which was relatively low to begin with, 
has been chipped away for years through the appropriations 
process. 
A federal UPK grant program designed to boost state 
capacity, rather create on-going cost-sharing arrangements,216 
should put more emphasis on a state’s ability to secure sustain-
able funding than previous programs have. The PDG rubric 
only awarded a maximum of 10 points, out of a possible 230, 
for “Budget and Sustainability”217 and elsewhere up to 12 points 
for describing how it would sustain high-quality preschool pro-
grams once the grant period ended.218 The minimal weight giv-
en to these criteria does not correspond to their demonstrated 
importance to successful UPK implementation, and SEAs com-
pleting these applications were required to do little more than 
offer conclusory statements about the strong support high-
quality preschool enjoys in the legislature and governor’s of-
fice.219 
As with stakeholder involvement, sustainability is a crite-
rion that should be afforded more weight, even at the expense 
of possibly diminishing the relative importance of the criteria 
regarding quality standards. As Florida’s experience shows,220 
 
U.S. FOR DEEPEST CUTS TO EDUCATION (2014). 
 216.  See supra Section III.a. 
 217.  Applications for New Awards; Preschool Development Grants – Development 
Grants, 79 Fed. Reg. 48854, 48866 (Aug. 18, 2014). 
 218.  Id. at 48865. 
 219.  ALA. DEP’T OF CHILDREN’S AFFAIRS, ALABAMA PRESCHOOL DEVELOPMENT 
GRANT PROJECT 42 (2014). 
 220.  See supra Section IV.c. 
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formulating quality standards can be much easier than funding 
them. 
In addition to affording sustainability more weight, a 
federal UPK grant program should require a more thorough 
analysis by prompting states to detail possible paths to the crea-
tion of embedded funding mechanisms and assess the political 
feasibility within the state of these various options.221 Georgia 
and Oklahoma offer two paradigms for applicant states to ex-
plore. As Zell Miller demonstrated, earmarking revenues from 
a wholly new source of funding can buffer a UPK program 
from the usual attacks by fiscal conservatives. In recent years, 
several states have been able to generate substantial revenue 
through the legalization of marijuana, revenue that is then used 
to create or bolster state spending programs, including some 
education programs.222 In states considering legalization, a fed-
eral grant program that prioritizes sustainability could encour-
age SEAs and their collaborating stakeholders to explore the vi-
ability pairing the potential revenues and a new UPK program. 
While marijuana-funded preschools may induce cognitive dis-
sonance, Georgia’s Lottery for Education shows how classical 
liberalism and education advocacy can make strange and effec-
tive bedfellows. 
Oklahoma provides another means of embedding fund-
ing. Applicant states should be encouraged to explore how the 
state’s existing laws for education funding might be amended to 
provide for an algorithmic calculation of pre-k funding, as Ok-
 
 221.  Alternatively, a grant program could craft a rubric that rewards points to states for 
actually having passed such laws. Opting for this approach stands to make a more definitive im-
pact but also imperils a programs political feasibility. See Shannon K. McGovern, Note, A New 
Model for States as Laboratories for Reform: How Federalism Informs Education Policy, 86 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1519, 1536-38 (2011). 
 222.  E.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 39-28.8-501 (West 2017); see David Gutman, Is 
Marijuana Money the Answer to Fund Washington Schools?, SEATTLE TIMES, Jan. 21, 2017, 
http://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/politics/state-weighs-using-pot-revenue-to-plug-
school-funding-gap/. 
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lahoma’s law now does. This approach may not be viable in a 
number of states, and was indeed explicitly rejected by Florida 
voters, because the notion of diverting existing funds away from 
other education programs is unpalatable. However, for states 
considering a substantial infusion of education funds or other 
major reforms, changes to funding formulas could be on the ta-
ble. 
Applicants may conceive of still other ways to embed 
funding. Some federal agencies have, for instance, been author-
ized by statute to generate their own funds by levying fees for 
certain services or through enforcement actions.223 A federal 
UPK grant program should encourage states to think creatively 
about all possible options for sustainability. 
As with prompting states for an assessment of grassroots 
support, requiring states to explore and document the possible 
paths to embedded funding serves two important functions. 
First, it will allow the federal government to funnel funds to 
those states most able to independently maintain sufficient lev-
els of funding after the federal capacity-building grant is ex-
pended. Second, it will make SEAs and collaborating stake-
holders cognizant of the opportunities present in their state and 
could mobilize their collective capabilities towards realizing 
these opportunities. 
 
VI.CONCLUSION 
 
“That’s something we should be able to do,” President 
Obama said of universal preschool in his 2013 speech to the na-
tion.224 The positive impact preschool can have on numerous 
life outcomes illustrate why this is a laudable goal. Even with 
 
 223.  Christopher DeMuth Sr. & Michael S. Greve, Agency Finance in the Age of Execu-
tive Government, 24 GEO. MASON L. REV. 555, 560-63, 567-68 (2017). 
 224.  President Barack Obama, State of the Union Address (Feb. 12, 2013). 
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finite resources, creating universal access to preschool should 
be prioritized over targeted programs. UPK not only effectu-
ates a number of national interests but may also secure equality 
benefits more effectively than targeted programs. 
However, Obama’s optimism about the feasibility of 
achieving instantaneous nation-wide UPK has been shown to 
be misplaced. His proposed state-federal cost sharing model 
gained no traction during his administration and its prospects 
of success during the current administration are virtually nil. A 
federal competitive grant program, on the other hand, has 
proven feasible and stands to make a profound impact in those 
states that participate. 
By emphasizing stakeholder participation, grassroots 
support, and the availability of embedded funding mechanisms, 
three conditions that have proven crucial to creating UPK on 
the state-level, the federal government can identify those states 
ripe for UPK implementation and provide capacity-bolstering 
funds to help them achieve it. Facilitating successful UPK re-
form in a handful of states might even create a ripple effect, 
spurring more and more states to implement UPK and eventu-
ally leading to a nation where preschool is indeed available to 
all. 
 
 
